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Between Europeanisation  
and Corporatisation:
Poland’s Nation Branding and  
Soft Power for Public Consumption
Paweł Surowiec, PhD
Journalism Studies, University of Shefield, Shefield, UK
Focusing on the “state” rather than the “nation,” this article explores the interplay 
between nation branding and Poland’s soft power statecraft. Contextualised by 
Poland’s european orientation in foreign affairs, this Bourdieusian study focuses on the 
field of diplomacy and statecraft, particularly its communicative practices for the 
articulation of soft power. aided by policy documents and campaign artefacts, this 
analysis of interviews (n=45) with state actors and newcomers to the field, nation 
branders, traces their actions, and unfolds the effects of their practices on soft power 
statecraft. The central argument emerging from the analysis of findings rests on the 
cultural conditions and ideological effects of nation branding on the field. On the one 
hand, I find, these effects advance the process of “corporatisation” of Poland’s soft 
power statecraft. On the other hand, the embeddedness of nation branding in Poland 
marks a cultural shift in soft power statecraft towards technocratic and transactional 
promotional culture.
Keywords: Poland; soft power; statecraft; nation branding; Europeanisation; corpo-
ratisation; Bourdieu
Introduction
Focusing on Poland, a relative latecomer to the race for more soft power in inter-
national relations, this article reveals the ideological effects of nation branding on 
diplomacy and statecraft. Since adopting the european orientation in foreign affairs, 
state actors endogenous to Poland’s field of diplomacy have embraced global com-
petitiveness as a priority in statecraft, to which exogenous actors, nation branders,1 
have responded opportunistically:
Nevertheless, in an increasingly competitive world, where there are far more nations 
than before and where technology offers remarkable promotion opportunities, nations 
continue to attempt to project their political power, influence and prestige; largely per-
haps for their own self-esteem. Nowadays, however, nations also need to compete on 
hard, quantifiable issues—exports, inward investment, and tourism. and this is new.2
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While in theory nation branders offer ready-made consultancy for statecraft, in prac-
tice their ascendance in the field is not as straightforward as adapting their solutions. 
In Poland, I argue, the field realities are shaped by two key processes affording oppor-
tunities for nation branders: europeanisation of foreign affairs and the corporatisation 
of statecraft. The former process of “europeanisation” involves “national adaptation, 
national articulation, identities reconstruction, modernisation and policy isomor-
phism.”3 The latter process of “corporatisation” entails the cultural orientation in 
statecraft whereby state actors “operate as if they were private firms facing competi-
tive environment.”4 Whilst the former makes up the political settings in which nation 
branders pursue the practice of nation branding, the latter, parallel to europeanisation, 
denotes nation branding as a mark of the “corporatisation” of soft power, that is, the 
application of corporate-style practices to statecraft. as a master term, “soft power 
statecraft”5 allows this study to extend the debate on communicative practices in the 
field of diplomacy to examine how and why nation branding, as a practice of non-
state actors, nation branders, fell on fertile ground in the Polish state.
If the rise of nation branding marks a shift in soft power statecraft enabled by 
the european orientation of foreign affairs, notably, it proves to be enduring too: 
irrespective of a dominant regime, formerly neo-liberal, or recently right-wing 
populist, nation branding resonates among policy makers. In 2016, the populist 
government of Beata Szydło established the Polish National Foundation, the over-
all mission of which is to “promote brand Poland,”6 as opposed to focusing on 
foreign affairs issues or interests. This logic of the dissociation of a “nation brand” 
from “political” interests echoes in academic definitions. according to Fan, a 
nation “has a brand image with or without national branding” and “nation brand-
ing” entails “applying branding and marketing communication techniques to pro-
mote a nation’s image.”7 In addition to decoupling foreign affairs interests from 
nation branding, the above disjunction centres on the “nation” rather than the 
“state,” typically the first target of nation branders.
Further, soft power statecraft relies on political communication,8 predominantly 
on the targeted practice of public diplomacy. Unlike public diplomacy, however, 
nation branding is modelled on “public–private partnerships,” and the transactional 
logic promising economic benefits in real terms.9 Upon entry to the field, the alleg-
edly universal idea of “branding” intermeshes with particularities of statecraft, chal-
lenging axiomatic assumptions about this practice. To uncover links between soft 
power statecraft and nation branding, this article draws from Bourdieu’s theories of 
state and practice. In doing so, it follows an interpretivist research agenda,10 making 
a twofold contribution to the field. First, by revealing the effects of nation branding 
on the field, it identifies transformations in statecraft. Second, by focusing on Poland, 
it contributes to the debate on the adaptation of Central and eastern european (Cee) 
states to the race for soft power regionally dominated by Russia.11 In what follows, 
the field of soft power statecraft refers to the social space endogenous to the state 
architecture, and overlapping with the field of diplomacy. This space is made up of 
state actors relying on a polyphonic approach to the articulation of national interests 
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and identities, as well as their interactive interplay with practices of newcomers 
exogenous to this space.
Why Poland?
The rationale for this study of nation branding in Poland entails academic, prac-
tice-related, and intuitive reasoning. academic underpinnings for bridging the gap 
between nation branding and soft power statecraft include not only limited studies 
examining links between the two, but also the conditions enabling the proliferation 
of nation branding. Conceptually, the Polish case opens avenues for moving from an 
actor-specific approach to field analysis, as nation branders exert multi-relational 
effects. analytically, Poland presents a case that permits inquiry about nation brand-
ing within broader regional and global processes. On the one hand, the europeanisation 
of foreign affairs enables changes to statecraft presumed to continue generating soft 
power advantages for the Polish state gained since the early 1990s. On the other 
hand, nation branding furthers the global process of shifting statecraft toward corpo-
rate-styled solutions. Finally, Poland makes a strong analytical case as nation brand-
ing is still perpetuated by policy makers, despite that it has lost currency elsewhere, 
even in the United Kingdom, where it was first conceived.
among practice-related arguments are those for understanding the implicit inner 
workings of nation branding in Poland. as such, this is not a study of “how to do 
nation branding” but an analysis focusing on the transformation of soft power state-
craft. In that regard, Poland becomes a centre-stage for the examination of the conten-
tious relationship between an orthodox conceptualisation and heterodox enactments 
of nation branding, and the ways in which nation branders were met with realities of 
the field. as well as revealing the pre-existing statecraft communicative practices for 
the articulation of soft power, Poland yields insights into the ways in which the logic 
of nation branding changes the field, and how practices—central and auxiliary—to 
nation branding aimed at re-structuring the field. Finally, the intuitive argument for 
undertaking this study of Poland stems from reflexive social theory encouraging me, 
in this case, to question my relationship with my own state. In essence, I was drawn to 
the analysis of nation branding motivated by intellectual and emotional curiosity 
about my relationship with Poland in a globalised world, central to which is a question 
about the role of nation branding in the articulation of identities shaping relationships 
between the state, its community and international community.
Towards Corporatisation of Diplomacy and Statecraft
With the europeanisation of foreign affairs reinforcing a turn in diplomacy, state-
craft practices aiding the globalisation of the Polish economy required broadening 
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its public and commercial appeal abroad. as a middle power in european affairs, 
Poland has adopted a polyphonic approach to soft power statecraft, that is, the archi-
tecture of the field that enables the articulation of national interests and identities by 
specialised actors. These articulations have been made possible by adapting along 
the way multiple state-sponsored statecraft practices, the most prominent of which, 
spanning the field of diplomacy, is public diplomacy.12 Closely related, cultural 
diplomacy is the lynchpin of Poland’s cultural relations, institutionalised as a prac-
tice for cultural exchanges in a fashion similar to that of its Western counterparts. 
The polyphonic approach is furthered by the use of investment marketing and desti-
nation marketing, two practices with market orientation, aiding Poland’s soft power 
statecraft, and centred on foreign direct investment and tourism respectively.
While a polyphonic approach to the articulation of soft power defines state-spon-
sored communicative practices in the field, Poland’s public diplomacy in particular, 
as elsewhere, has been theorised through the prism of the “new” public diplomacy 
paradigm, inspired by models directly derived from the theory and practice of corpo-
rate public relations. The emergence of corporate-styled nation branding has, how-
ever, triggered transactional dynamics and furthered the requirement to examine 
non-state actors in the field, which are not only dominated by the state but which, in 
addition, tend to operate in silos.13
although corporate public relations models, particularly those shaped by the logic 
of relationship building14 and networks,15 echo in the existing analysis of Poland’s 
soft power statecraft,16 data-laden research is needed to unpack how newer practices 
such as nation branding intermesh with statecraft and, in turn, transform the field. 
While studies of nation branding in Poland tend to focus on “the nation,”17 by asking 
and answering the following questions, this article shifts the analytical focus to “the 
state” and “statecraft” in particular:
Research question 1: What institutional conditions enabled the rise of nation branding? 
Research question 2: What nation branding initiatives were undertaken? Research ques-
tion 3: What were the trajectories of action among nation branders? Research question 4: 
What effects has nation branding had on statecraft?
Between Soft Power and Nation Branding
The concept of “soft power” pertains to influence through “state” and “national” 
reputations in the conduct of foreign affairs. Based on the attractiveness of 
resources such as political values, cultures, or wealth, in the field of diplomacy 
and statecraft these are rendered as capable of engendering persuasive effects. 
While ties between soft power statecraft and communicative practices such as 
public diplomacy are established,18 the rise of nation branding added complexity 
to the inquiry. To aid the debate on transformations of statecraft, and to overcome 
terminological issues stemming from the limits of under-developed ontologies, I 
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argue for a context-specific analysis of the “national” fields of soft power state-
craft. With the exception of articles by Sharman19 and Browning,20 links between 
nation branding and foreign affairs remain tenuous, leaving an opportunity to 
examine how monophonic nation branding ascends to the field that, by default, 
articulates soft power in polyphonic ways.
Unlike public diplomacy, the practice disseminating ideologies in foreign affairs,21 
branding is ideological ex definitione, as through ascending to “new” fields it per-
petuates the logic of marketing. as an ideological practice, it is defined by perceived 
added value and the transactional relationship of commodification22 that accommo-
dates “signifiers in order to legitimate itself within language.”23 Notably, branding 
expands its portfolio of referents: “product branding,” “corporate branding,” “ser-
vice branding,” and this acquisition-by-merger strategy extends to statecraft. Of 
these, nation branding is a proxy of corporate branding, following the a priori 
assumption about the universality of this synergy-making practice, namely, that “cor-
porate level brands can also apply to countries, regions, and cities.”24
Bourdieu, State Power, and European Affairs
Despite the celebratory embrace of the transactional logic of branding, the exist-
ing social theory–inspired analysis recognizes that nation branding has not emerged 
in a “post-political” vacuum. For example, Jensen was one of the first to discuss the 
implications of the reductionist market fundamentalism25 of nation branding as a 
practice “designed” for the articulation of nation identities. Volcic and andrejevic 
theorise nation branding as a global trend expressing commercial nationalism.26 In 
her seminal work, offering a Cee regional perspective27 on nation branding, Kaneva 
refocuses the debate on nation branding by considering it in broader political set-
tings, and argues for the search of systematic critique of this practice. Finally, 
aronczyk brings the concept of a “competition state”28 to the debate about nation 
branding and, in doing so, puts the analytical focus on the “state” rather than the 
“nation.” Focusing on statecraft, arguably, this study takes the discussion of nation 
branding a step further.
Drawing from the theoretical oeuvre of Bourdieu, this section sets the stage for 
the analysis of nation branding as an ideological practice. Undoubtedly, Bourdieu’s 
theorisation of the state is relevant to soft power statecraft as his theories have been 
used for the study of foreign affairs29 and nation branding,30 although this article 
focuses on his view of the “state” as the setting behind “statecraft.” For Bourdieu 
et al., the state is the “concentration of different species of capital,” the power of 
which rests “in the realm of symbolic production that the grip of the state is felt most 
powerfully.” It is through the struggles for legitimacy that symbolic power as “the 
effect of the state”31 is exerted over actors in diverse fields. Bourdieu’s theories of the 
state and practice are advantageous to this study as they favour empirical inquiry 
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about particular fields, which permits unpacking orthodox and heterodox views on 
nation branding. These theories are pertinent to the analysis of the ideological effects 
that, exogenous to the state, nation branding has had on state actors endogenous to 
the field of soft power statecraft.
Mirrored in this article, Bourdieu’s conceptualisation of the state recognizes the 
demarcation between national and european fields of power, as nation branding 
plays out at the crossroads of the two, in the field of soft power statecraft. His social 
theories neither explicitly focus on the europeanisation of foreign affairs, nor do they 
explore statecraft. In his works, Bourdieu, however, refers to the integration of 
european markets,32 the process that gave the impetus to the europeanisation of 
foreign affairs, enabling nation branding to emerge. extending his theorisation of the 
state to european affairs, arnholtz and Hommerslev note that the “construction of 
europe is often undertaken by actors closely connected with national fields of 
power.”33 Bourdieu does not single out “soft power” as separate to a field of power, 
but his take on the “symbolic grip of the state” aligns with it through the use of “cul-
ture, political ideals, and policies” in statecraft and the persuasion that is “an impor-
tant part of it.”34
Soft power statecraft is central to Poland’s strategic culture as it is a prism for the 
interpretation of the landscape of foreign affairs. Defined as “an ideational context 
surrounding the decision-makers in a state at any one time, shaping which options 
are perceived as effective and productive by the decision makers with regard to par-
ticipation in military operation,”35 strategic culture pertains to “hard power”; how-
ever, the stipulative logic of this term is relevant to “soft power” too. When faced 
with a strategic landscape, policy makers tend to rely on preconceived beliefs. The 
core belief of policy makers is that Poland’s interests in european affairs require 
advancement but, given limitations to statecraft, state actors resort to ideas exoge-
nous to the field. Done this way, strategic culture, endogenous to statecraft, inter-
twines with practices derived from promotional culture, which shape the field in 
ways in which those practices become “virtually co-extensive with our produced 
symbolic world.”36
Field, Practice, and Cultural Intermediaries
In a Bourdieusian analysis, adler-Nissen recognizes that the conduct of foreign 
affairs starts at home37 and, by extension, resources for the field of soft power state-
craft can be enhanced with input from public affairs. Therefore, the analytical focus 
of this article is a “field”:
a network, or configuration, of objective relations between positions. These positions 
are objectively defined, in their existence and in determinations they impose upon 
occupants, agents or institutions, by their present and the potential situation (situs) in 
the structure of the distribution of species of power (or capital) whose possession 
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commands access to the specific profits that are at stake in the field, as well as by their 
objective relation to other positions (domination, subordination, homology, etc.).38
Fields denote spaces for the production, circulation, and appropriation of goods, 
services, knowledge, or status by actors struggling for legitimacy. Bourdieu’s theo-
risation of action relies on semi-autonomous fields of practice. He explains practice 
as a struggle over ideas, power, and resources. Their analysis focuses on “objective 
structures” and “subjective dispositions”39 through which actors display practical 
knowledge. The actions of nation branders, as new entrants to the field of soft power 
statecraft, are prone to diverse strategies underpinned by uncertainty. Since actors 
face constraints and opportunities, action seldom renders anticipated outcomes. 
Strategies are ritualised, but whether the action conforms to the rules of the field 
depends on self-interest. action should neither be exclusively read as the pursuit of 
material resources, nor is all action prone to ideological misrecognition. In these 
settings, actors are practical strategists, trading in resources and dispositions.40
Finally, nation branders are deemed to be a class of cultural intermediaries. Their 
cultural dispositions render them a “new” bourgeoisie.41 This prefix new implies 
social mobility but by no means are they homogenous. For example, there are local 
and transnational nation branders. Following eyal et al.,42 this article identifies dis-
positions derived from promotional culture as yielding better mobility prospects in 
present-day Poland than those acquired during the Soviet era. While the field of 
power accepts consultants, their actions in the field of soft power statecraft remain 
unclear. In entering it, however, cultural intermediaries embrace political concepts 
such as “state” or “nation”—central to the analysis of nation branding. as newcom-
ers to the field, they intermediate between public affairs and foreign affairs.
Inadvertently, this study reveals limitations to Bourdieu’s theories of state and 
practice. These are particularly notable with regards to the field boundaries problem. 
While Bourdieu speaks of political fields or bureaucratic fields, his conception of 
state is not as far reaching as to differentiate the field of diplomacy, and the ways it 
overlaps with the field of power. This critique extends to his conception of the state 
as an accumulation of power, and subsequent use of the term “field of power” as if it 
was a separate entity. In this article, the problem of field boundaries has been moder-
ated by following empirical realities in Poland: as the field of diplomacy has the 
strongest influence over the field of soft power statecraft, it is apparent that those two 
fields overlap with each other; however, there are more state actors holding respon-
sibility for soft power statecraft than those positioned in the field of diplomacy.
Methodology and Analytical Procedures
The aim of this study is to explore the relationship between nation branding and 
soft power statecraft. Bourdieu’s “structuralist constructivism”43 ontology stresses 
struggles between actors, beyond the confines of institutions, within the structures 
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of particular fields. This worldview is mirrored in this analysis of soft power state-
craft, as it foregrounds how state actors endogenous to the field relate to exogenous, 
non-state actors, nation branders. Taking an actor-specific approach, this meso-level 
analysis is sensitive to the field structure, and other “structuring structures” evoked 
by participants, for example, a “field of media.”
answers to the research questions (p. 5) were drawn from multiple sources, 
including semi-structured interviews, campaign artefacts, and policy documents. a 
sample of participants (n = 45) was recruited in Warsaw and London among consul-
tants, decision makers, diplomats, public diplomats and strategic communicators 
engaged in nation branding. The recruitment of participants for this study, on both 
the supply (nation branders) and demand (targeted state actors) sides of the relation-
ship, followed convenience and snowballing techniques, particularly using the crite-
ria of self-declared expertise in nation branding, a traceable record of the participation 
in the field and direct exposure to nation branding. Interviews were conducted in the 
participants’ mother tongue, in Polish or english (appendix 1). The fieldwork took 
place between June and September 2009, March and april 2010, and September and 
October 2014. Interviews were recorded, transcribed, anonymised, and supple-
mented by field notes. Translations prioritised the targeted language. In addition, 
field artefacts (e.g., policy proposals, consultancy reports, press releases, advertise-
ments, op-eds) were collected to cross-examine interviews. On transcript data, a dis-
course analysis was conducted44 to report actions in the field and, by following 
themes of emic, inner-group and etic, outer-group perspectives, to unpack relation-
ships between the actors. This approach aligns with Pamment’s research agenda on 
nation branding and the capabilities of soft power.45
Findings
Mapping of the Field
The field of soft power statecraft is an extension of the field of power of the 
Polish state in which its government occupies the dominant position. Of significance 
to the field were these state actors: the Ministry of Foreign affairs (MFa), the 
Ministry of Culture and Heritage, and the Ministry of economy, all of which played 
different roles in setting the orientation of foreign affairs. The field of diplomacy 
was largely, but not exclusively, aligned with the Ministry of Foreign affairs, the 
actor which had administrative bearing over the Council for Poland’s Promotion, an 
advisory body aimed at coordinating the field. This field overlaps with the field of 
diplomacy as the Ministry of Foreign affairs oversees the Department of Public and 
Cultural Diplomacy. The Ministry of Culture and Heritage, however, had control 
over the adam Mickiewicz Institute, the state actor responsible for cultural relations. 
The above state actors were engaged in the practices of public diplomacy and cul-
tural diplomacy.
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The polyphonic setup of the field was supplemented by the practices of the state 
actors affiliated with the Ministry of economy, namely the Polish Tourism 
Organisation, the Polish agency for enterprise Development, the Polish Information 
and Foreign Investment agency, and temporarily by the PL.2012, the purpose-built 
agency behind the organisation of the 2012 european Football Championship eURO 
tournament. Structurally, this agency was aligned with the Ministry of Sport and 
Tourism, but acted in the capacity of an actor engaged in soft power statecraft until 
2013. These state actors do not make up the entire field, but for the purpose of this 
article, provide entry into the field in which nation branders left their traces.
Finally, among exogenous actors that shaped the field are either networked coali-
tions of marketing and advertising agencies such as the advertising for Poland 
association led by the eskadra group and adPress, or associations representing 
business interests such as the Polish Brand Institute, an associate of the Polish 
Chamber of Commerce. The network of public relations consultants forming the 
“Public Relations 4 Poland” played its role in the field too, as did think tanks, for 
example, the Institute of Public affairs, and foundations, for example, the eastern 
Institute. These were local actors who were engaged in nation branding or advocacy 
for this practice. among the transitional nation branders were Saffron Brand 
Consultants, DDB Corporate Profiles, Young & Rubicam, and Saatchi & Saatchi, 
branding agencies that either operated transnationally or in Warsaw, and began offer-
ing their consultancy to governments.
Mobilising Effects: Planting the Idea
Illustrating the openness of the field, participants’ emic accounts reveal that 
Poland’s statecraft became a fertile ground for promotional culture (research ques-
tion 1). Nation branding emerged at the cross-roads between the Polish state, corpo-
rate actors, and the coalition of actors from the marketing and public relations 
industries (Figure 1). Coalescing the conduct of foreign affairs with statecraft as an 
ideological practice, nation branding was introduced to the field by local cultural 
intermediaries. One of its early iterations, the 2001 “Poland: europe Is Bigger” 
campaign by DDB Corporate Profiles, was launched by the Ministry of Foreign 
affairs. Reported by home and foreign media, it became a landmark iteration of 
nation branding, creating a bias in understanding of the field towards practices rep-
resented in the news.
While representations of branding were hardly new, the scope of nation branding 
goes beyond the landmark campaign. a myth of branding existed among partici-
pants, and brands embodying perceived national commercial success were idealised 
as, arguably, since the early days of systemic transformation, the Polish economy has 
failed to produce global corporate or product brands which could have been lever-
aged through soft power statecraft. The myth of branding was identified as the cul-
tural interplay between state socialism and capitalism, embodying a self-fulfilling 
prophecy of Western corporate capitalism:
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Figure 1
Timeline summarising key institutional developments in the field: actors and 
policies
2017 ‘Brand Poland’ guidelines were added to MFa’s ‘Poland’s Promotion, 2017-27’ 
2016 Polish National Foundation was established
2013 MFa publishes ‘Principles for Communicating the Polska Brand’ guidelines
2011 ‘Brand Poland’ conferences organised as part of the Presidency of the eU Council
2010 MFa institutionalises public diplomacy and renames the Department of Promotion
 Ministry of economics ‘The Strategy for Internationalisation of Polish Economy’
2007 ‘Poland at 2010 EXPO World Exhibition in Shanghai’ proposed by DDB
 ‘Creative Tension’ second consultancy report was produced
 PL.2012 was set up to support mega sporting event the eURO 2012 tournament 
2006 Public Relations for Poland coalition was formed
 MFa launched ‘The Strategy for Poland’s Promotion, 2007-2015’
2004 ‘Creative Tension’ first consultancy document was produced
 Poland joins the european Union and the european Single Market
2003 Saffron Brand Consultancy was commissioned by the Polish Chamber of Commerce
 Polish Information and Foreign Investment agency was established
 ‘Nation Brand Building Programme’ becomes component of public policy
2001 ‘An Economy Under its Own Flag’ scheme features in ‘Time Magazine’
 ‘Poland: Europe is bigger’ campaign was designed by DDB and launched by MFa
2000 Polish agency for enterprise and Development was established
1999 Polish Tourism Organisation was founded
 Institute of adam Mickiewicz was founded
 emergence of the advertising for Poland association coalition
 Initiation of the first nation branding project ‘Session of the Century’
1998 Diplomacy focusing the european Union membership begins
1997 Polish government announces the National Integration Strategy
1995  ‘The Programme for Restoring the Role of and Importance of Brand Names and Trade-
marks’ was announced and endorsed by President aleksander Kwaśniewski 
 The Institute of Polish Brand was set up within the Polish Chamber of Commerce
1990 Polish Chamber of Commerce was established
1989 Formal beginning of political economy systemic transformations in Poland
1917 early modernism era: propaganda is a dominant institutional practice in MFa
Hmm . . . there are people who claim that it is important for Poland to have a national 
brand. They claim that having a nation brand means that a country is better perceived, 
it is better recognisable. In their view, this can leverage into, say, economic perfor-
mance. So, if a state is more recognisable and perceived positively. . . . Because, you 
see, “a brand” is a positive term, it is not pejorative, right? It has clear positive con-
notations. So, if we say, in Polish—I don’t know about english as this might be cultur-
ally different—but in Polish, if we say, “this is a brand,” we automatically assume 
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“quality.” We do not explicitly have to state, “good quality.” We subconsciously 
assume that we talk about a “good quality.” Henceforth, going back to nation branding, 
if you assume that Poland needs to have a nation brand, as some argue, it would auto-
matically increase Poland’s international prestige.46
The attribution of “outstanding recognition” or “extraordinary qualities” to com-
modities or organisations was seen as aiding soft power, allowing the merger and the 
amplification of the country-of-origin effect in statecraft.47 In demystifying brand-
ing, the following simplification unfolded: a reference to an object as a “brand” 
creates a “subject” that signifies post-1989 premium market positioning. In turn, this 
misrecognition allowed nation branders to gain advantage in terms of the appeal of 
their idea and enabled them to establish affinity with the field. apart from the myth 
of branding, issues pertaining to the european orientation of Poland’s foreign affairs 
were discernible as a theme enabling nation branding. This political challenge turned 
the field into a marketplace for statecraft ideas and practices:
We are starting off with a big european project, promotion of the Polish economy, 
which is part of “The Innovative economy” programme. Thanks to this programme we 
are hoping to finalise the construction of the overarching “meta-narrative” about 
Poland and then transfer it into our area to do with promotion of branded exports.48
Bridging the past and the present, nation branding was juxtaposed against the early 
modern levée en masse mobilisation of nobles at times when european affairs were 
challenging for Poland. Using culturally loaded comparisons, the idea of nation 
branding was seen as a remedy to the imbalances stemming from limited Polish 
iconic commercial brands on european markets:
Marketing is the warfare of our times. Similarly to nation branding, the Polish Hussars 
advancing at Kircholm or Vienna did a good job for Poland as a “brand.”49
Despite the mis-contextualisation, since nation branding had been conceived for 
statecraft as opposed to warcraft, this idea has had mobilising effects. The conditions 
enabling the nation branders’ entry into the field included proliferation of the myth 
of branding, the european orientation of foreign affairs, commercial opportunities, 
and the re-orientation of statecraft towards an approach to soft power that bridges 
strategic culture with promotional culture (research question 1).
Popularising Effects: Acculturation to Branding
Despite the association of nation branding in Poland with “Creative Tension,”50 
participants reported this practice as the advancement of promotional culture in 
the national field of power (research question 2) preceding the emergence of this 
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archetypical project conceived by Western consultants. For example, in 1999, the 
President Kwaśniewski endorsed “The Programme for Restoring the Role of and 
Importance of Brands and Trademarks”51 proposed by the Polish Chamber of 
Commerce and called for consumer patriotism by supporting local brands. guided 
by insights from a piece of market research, “The economy Under Its Flag,” the 
Chamber established “The academy of Brands,” a commercial scheme aimed at 
popularising corporate branding among businesses.52 The value of the scheme was 
exemplified with a print advertising campaign, “an economy Under its Own 
Flag,” featuring in Time magazine.53
as well as commissioning campaigns, nation branders reported parallel trajecto-
ries. The head of the Polish Brand Institute,an associate of the Chamber of Commerce, 
became the key advocate popularising the idea and practice of branding. His famil-
iarity with nation branding, shaped by co-operation with Saffron Brand Consultants, 
became a source upholding this ideology. Initially, the Institute popularised nation 
branding by publishing books by transnational consultants. This scheme was labelled 
“The Library of Brand academy.” He promoted the idea of nation branding among 
policy makers and Polish youth, and billed it “an act of education.” In the meantime, 
targeting state actors with their proposals (“The Session of the Century”; “The 
apple”; “Poland: europe Is Bigger”), more nation branders engaged with the field. 
To capitalise on what Bourdieu calls practical knowledge,54 and to leverage an idea 
into practice, the search for a unique selling proposition of brand architecture turned 
into a competition instead of a collaboration among the actors:
For implementation, completion of projects, I am guessing. I was not always quite 
certain at times. Because for so many years nothing was happening, and I was observ-
ing how different men were jumping down each other’s throats. I finally concluded that 
I should do my own thing.55
Practical Knowledge Effects
While aronczyk points to “Logo for Poland” or “Creative Tension”56 as, respec-
tively, landmark or archetypical nation branding undertakings, the struggle to adopt 
and routinize nation branding into the field goes back to august 1999 (research 
question 3). Comprising marketing consultancies and media agencies, a local, not-
for-profit coalition was formed. a key role in this coalition was played by the 
eskadra group and adPress. acting as the conduit between the industry and the 
field, this network aimed to reduce competition by the co-creation of campaigns. 
Initially, the Polish Tourism Organisation was targeted. Formalised as the advertising 
for Poland association, the network started off with a brainstorming session, “The 
Session of the Century.” The coalition offered expertise and took steps towards 
“systematic promotion of the tourism dimension of brand Poland.”57
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The creative idea for the first advertising campaign, “Poland: adventure With a 
Happy ending,” aimed at challenging stereotypes about Polishness in germany. Its 
planning began once the association was established, but soon lost momentum. In 
the meantime, the association generated publicity to showcase its goals. although 
the campaign gained the attention of the Polish Tourism Organisation, discussion 
over its launch came to a stop. The artefacts pointing to the practice of nation brand-
ing are the association’s manifesto, “The Session of the Century,” a draft of a con-
sultancy proposal, “On Poland With Passion,” and the campaign storyboards.58 The 
Polish Tourism Organisation highlighted limitations to the creative side of the cam-
paign as a reason for not commissioning it. The attempts at the revival of the 
association proved unsuccessful and their expertise was traded elsewhere.59
a similar scenario was reported in the case of the local public relations consul-
tants’ scheme, “Public Relations 4 Poland.” In 2006, a network of public relations 
industry leaders formed a coalition aimed at counselling state actors in the field. 
This coalition embarked on a publicity campaign in the industry’s professional 
press and news media, which they aimed to leverage, to no avail, into relationships 
with actors in the field. This time, the Ministry of Foreign affairs was targeted. 
after a few months, this coalition lost momentum and initial negotiations with the 
head of Public and Cultural Diplomacy at the Ministry of Foreign affairs did not 
yield results or decisions.60
additional nation branding initiatives emerged as consultancy proposals. For 
example, the proposal “Poland at 2010 eXPO World exhibition in Shanghai”61 was 
not taken up by the field. In response, nation branders adjusted their trajectories of 
action and, in the absence of a cross-institutional platform for long-term collabora-
tion, engaged in tactical tasks such as the launch of the 2008 TV advertising cam-
paigns in the US media (e.g., Autumn of Change and Eye on Poland62); publicity in 
foreign media (e.g., special reports in Financial Times63); production of logos or 
booklets (e.g., Market Identity by Institute of Polish Brand), events (e.g., Young & 
Rubicam held workshops for the Polish Tourism Organisation), and the conduct of 
market research (e.g., Institute of Public affairs or Nation Brand Index). The under-
taking of tactical tasks by local nation branders was partly driven by the arrival of 
transnational consultants. Between 2003 and 2008, the field focused on the arche-
typical nation branding programme Creative Tension,64 the re-iteration of which 
emerged in situ. The archetypical programme was not launched as per the design of 
its makers but, over time, interactions with state actors have shaped awareness of 
nation branding.
Monopolising Effects: Reiterations of the Older as the Newer
On 25 October 2013 the Council for the Promotion of Poland, an advisory body 
chaired by the Minister of Foreign affairs, publicised guidelines entitled “Principles 
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for Communicating the Polska Brand.”65 Notably, management changes at the 
Ministry were deemed as facilitating a shift in the approach to soft power state-
craft.66 On this occasion, a network of nation branders aided the production of 
guidelines for a wide-scale nation branding campaign explicitly reiterating Creative 
Tension. In 2014, the actions of nation branders finally gained impetus. given that 
public celebrations had been opportune promotional events for the state actors in the 
field, nation branders were mobilised by the twenty-fifth anniversary of reinstating 
democracy and the tenth anniversary of Poland’s eU membership.
Implicitly linked with the guidelines, the Public and Cultural Diplomacy 
Department at the MFa commissioned a TV advertising campaign titled Poland: 
Spring to New . . .. Produced by Saatchi & Saatchi in Warsaw, the campaign featured 
on CNN, BBC, Sky News, and eurosport. The tenth anniversary of Poland’s eU 
membership was seen as an opportunity for nation branders to reflect on soft power 
statecraft. given the perceived positive coverage of Polish economy in foreign news 
media, following a decade of rapid economic growth, the above events mobilised yet 
another coalition of nation branders. Collectively, its leaders acknowledged that the 
above changes were enabling the idea for Poland: Spring Into . . . as an authentic 
statecraft resource. Yet, the publishing of “fixed” brand guidelines, alongside the 
campaign, stood in opposition to the polyphonic approach to soft power statecraft: 
while the MFa supported the fruits of the nation branders’ practice, and collaborated 
with them on the advertising campaign, this was met with mixed attitudes by other 
field actors.
Homogenising Effects: Local Appropriations
an ideological practice of nation branding emerged, driven by a mixture of com-
mercial pitches and public affairs tactics (research question 4). as such, it ascended 
to the field as a relation of communication. This insight is consistent with Bourdieu’s 
view of ideologies as structuring structures, but he cautions against the reduction of 
power to communicative relations. Indeed, the field conditions further reveal the 
inner workings of nation branding. Over time, interactions between actors have led 
to local appropriations of nation branding into institutional policies. Illuminating 
insight comes from the Polish Tourism Organisation, for which its own practice of 
destination marketing enhances brand Poland:
The tourism dimension of brand Poland as the most important aspect of our mega-
brand “Poland” might become an engine for marketing Poland overseas. This strategy 
can become a pioneering promotional artistry in a particularly important decade of 
modernisation already implemented in Poland as an eU member state.67
In the institutional policy, another field actor, the Institute of adam Mickiewicz, 
reveals the alignment of their practices with the idea of nation brand. Drawing from 
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Creative Tension, the Institute’s practice of cultural diplomacy is explicitly reported 
as linked to nation branding, illustrating the expanding scope of its localised appro-
priations:
1. To increase the value of the brand “Poland”; 2. To enhance effectiveness and of 
brand Poland’s communication in the area of cultural exchanges; 3. To maintain the 
fifth position on the european market for cultural exchanges.68
The Institute’s policy speaks of the nation brand architecture, and highlights points 
of leverage between product brands (e.g., films, art works), cultural diplomacy (e.g., 
“Polish Year in UK”), the Institute’s corporate brand and, finally, Poland as a brand. 
Reflective of the field dynamics, the Institute’s policy points out a “lack of clear 
visual identity of brand Poland.”69 These statements reveal, however, that cultural 
diplomacy is seen as enhancing the nation brand.
The idea of nation branding became explicit yet again during the eURO 2012 
mega-sporting event held in Poland and Ukraine, which was used by the field actors 
as an opportunity to increase their foreign media coverage. This time, interactions 
between nation branders and PL.2012, the purpose-built actor behind the tourna-
ment, took the form of workshops through which the organisers of the eURO 2012 
were exposed to the idea of nation branding. Delivered on 13 and 23 July 2009, the 
workshops were spaces for sharing ideas about the branded vision of Polishness. The 
reproduction of the archetypical programme was explicit in the workshop presenta-
tion titled “guidelines for Promotion of Brand Poland in the Context of UeFa eURO 
2010™”:
The strategy for brand Poland is a “supreme being” and a reference point for thinking 
about the strategy for promotion of Poland in the context of eURO 2012. as it stands, 
the weakness is the poor transferability of the Creative Tension core idea to a specific 
set of promotional activities, which could make the main direction for promoting brand 
Poland via specific tactics.70
The appropriation of nation branding was not in all instances shaped by the actions 
of nation branders. For example, no field evidence was found to show that the Polish 
agency for enterprise Development had appropriated nation branding as an out-
come of interactions with its advocates. Yet nation branding is evident in their 
Saragossa 2008 eXPO policy:
according to the research conducted for the Organising Committee in November 2006, 
Poland, to an average Spaniard, is a cold, dark, poor, and sad country. It is a country in 
which nothing exciting happens, a country that one should stay away from. Poles, on 
the other hand, are perceived as clever, hard-working, and honest but, at the same time, 
as introverted and full of complexes. We are faced with an interesting situation 
whereby for Spaniards the brand “Poland” virtually does not exists, but brand “Pole” 
has several positive attributes.71
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These insights reveal that nation branding leads to a homogenising effect: “nation 
brand” is appropriated as a signifier of symbolic assets or, implicitly, outcomes of 
pre-existing statecraft practices. Transforming the field, state actors imply that com-
municative practices add value to “brand Poland” and are positioned as aiding soft 
power statecraft.
Universalising and Transgressive Effects: Fields of Power in 
Poland and Europe
The perpetuation of nation branding proceeded further, and, at a point, diplomatic 
and political leaders began employing the discourse on nation branding. Despite 
their discontent with the state actors in the field, nation branders note its universal 
use in the field of power:
a few months have passed, and Minister Sikorski says that he and his experts have 
produced some kind of strategy, and all of a sudden, he talks about brand “Polska,” and 
claims that in the branding efforts we should use the term “Polska.” Nobody says that 
it was Michael’s idea; nobody says where it came from, but they sell those ideas as their 
own. OK, he is a politician. But it is interesting to see how nation branding is circu-
lated.72
Indeed, this type of appropriation is explicit in the Parliamentary exposés. For exam-
ple, Radosław Sikorski, the head of diplomacy, employed the discourse on nation 
branding in legitimising the orientation of the Civic Platform government’s foreign 
affairs73. Jarosław Kaczyński, the leader of Law and Justice, appropriated its dis-
course too. While nation branders claimed that Kaczyński opposed the wide-scale 
nation branding programme, through the practice of media relations, he perpetuates 
the idea of a brand as soft power asset:
It is the government’s task to act determinedly to change this situation; to make sure 
that the investigation gets to the truth, but also act to protect the status of Poland and 
defend the Polish brand, as this brand is seriously threatened, weakened, and 
degraded.74
With the re-emergence of nation branding in the Polish field of power, its reproduc-
tion rests on it appropriation by political leaders, further de-contextualising it from 
the orthodox model of nation branders. Despite their claims that wide-scale cam-
paigning was hindered by party politics, field insights reveal that nation branding 
was used by the leading political parties: Civic Platform and the Law and Justice. as 
an ideology, therefore, nation branding has had homogenising effects on statecraft, 
and universalising effects in the field of power.
eventually, the appropriation of nation branding led to its transmission beyond the 
national field of power. For example, the 2011 Poland’s Presidency of the Council of 
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the eU witnessed Polish political leaders introducing nation branding into the 
european field of power: in October 2011, the european Parliament hosted a confer-
ence curated by the Civic Platform’s eMPs and co-organised by the Polish Ministry 
of economics and the Institute for eastern Studies, “Brand Poland: enhancing 
Images of Poland Worldwide.” at the event, discussion of Poland’s standing in 
european affairs intertwined with nation branding. In turn, the conference was 
indexed by news media at home, illustrating demand for reporting on the particulari-
ties of Poland’s soft power statecraft in european affairs.75
although used sparingly by political leaders, the discourse on nation branding 
goes beyond its illocutionary function. Despite the affinity with liberal politics, there 
is new evidence emerging that, in 2016, the populist Law and Justice government 
established the Polish National Foundation, a body that perpetuates the ideology of 
nation branding, for example, to respond to the international backlash against the 
constitutional crises in Poland. The trend continues elsewhere: in 2017, the MFa 
adapted “Polish Foreign Policy 2017-2021,”76 in which nation branding appears as a 
shortcut for intangible assets stemming from soft power statecraft. The publication 
of the guidelines Poland’s Promotion, 2017-2777 and Brand Poland78 followed.
Discussion
emic accounts by participants paint the following field image: wide-scale initia-
tives were not actioned as per the orthodox vision79 of nation branders but, similarly 
to insights emerging from the works of Kaneva80 or Ståhlberg and Bolin,81 the idea 
of nation as a “brand” resonates in the field and beyond. Despite the failure to get a 
collaborative programme off the ground, nation branding is not an “empty signifier,” 
and by perpetuating this ideology, its advocates reinforce the prevailing order of 
strategic culture in which Poland’s standing in foreign affairs is articulated as a 
“brand.” Struggling to leverage commercial brands as sources for soft power state-
craft, nation branding mobilised anew communicative resources and power relations 
in the field. among policy makers, the appeal of nation branding lay in their belief 
about what could be achieved for statecraft in the face of europeanisation as struc-
tural “top-down” pressure on the Polish state.82
emic accounts foreground asymmetries in soft power capabilities, and the trans-
formations in the field of soft power statecraft. The findings substantiate Bourdieu 
et al.’s axiom about the state as a holder of meta-power: it monopolises nation brand-
ing within the field and beyond its boundaries as, notably, one of the “species of 
power.”83 given that nation branding has ideological and praxis qualities, the 
reported interactions of nation branders with the field put Bourdieu’s concepts of 
field and practice to test. On the one hand, the migratory effects of nation branding 
highlight the problem of field boundaries. On the other hand, apart from developing 
nation branding campaigns, the field left traces of auxiliary practices, namely, advo-
cacy tactics used to institutionalise nation branding into statecraft.
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advocacy is a tactic used in public affairs. Findings reaffirm that the emergence 
of nation branding involved commercial pitches and public affairs tactics, targeting 
state actors in the field. To that end, nation branding mobilised multi-trajectory 
action. Bourdieu recognises three action strategies: conservation strategies are pur-
sued by actors who hold a dominant position in the field; succession strategies define 
attempts to gain access to dominant positions by new entrants; in contrast, subver-
sion strategies are pursued by actors who expect to gain little.84 While non-state 
actors pursued nation branding, simultaneously, as a class of cultural intermediaries, 
they struggled for the adoption of their practice into statecraft. In doing so, they 
deployed strategies that go beyond the practices central to it.
Matching the Bourdieusian field theory, the interaction of state actors with nation 
branders was a struggle for the recognition of nation branding. Its advocates applied 
succession strategies to advance their corporate interests within the field. But their 
action went further: they strived to influence soft power statecraft guidelines, and 
attempted to override the field order by sharing the bulk of campaigning with private 
sector actors. The subversion strategies involved public affairs tactics such as policy 
scanning, web activism, coalition building, community relations, engagement in 
steering committees, and extensive media relations. additional auxiliary practices 
involved the production of consultancy reports, market research, professional pub-
lishing, policy proposals, meetings with policy makers, workshops, conferencing, 
and public speaking.85 These drove the interactions in the field between 1999 and 
2016 when nation branding was contested as an idea for soft power statecraft.
In advancing newer practices, cultural intermediaries, the disposition of whom lie 
in promotional culture, demonstrate how continuity and discontinuity of action adds 
to the field of uncertainty.86 The mobilising effects of nation branding brought change 
to the field dynamics as the bottom-up actions of nation branders aggrandized brands 
and branding in the field of diplomacy and statecraft. The effects of nation branding 
exceed the mobilisation of action, and link to Bourdieu’s understanding of qualita-
tive changes to the ways democracies expand the use of efficiency and marketing 
techniques as an “instrument of legitimation of power.”87 The interplay of the strate-
gic culture of the Polish state with nation branding demonstrates how prevailing 
business interests model statecraft to the tune of corporate managerialism. Further, 
Bourdieu’s insight into the market logic resonates in the field, as by changing the 
logic of pre-existing communicative practices, nation branders advance the doxa of 
market relations, presupposing de-politicisation,88 the logic of which is publically 
appealing in Poland.
as a structuring ideology, nation branding brought to the field asymmetries of 
rationality, yielding misrecognitions of the process of europeanisation. First, the 
monophonic modus operandi of nation branding designed around “public-private 
partnership” proved unfit for polyphonic statecraft. Second, enabling the rise of 
nation branding, the myth of branding was reinforced by the simplification that cor-
porate managerialism guarantees professionalism in the field. Third, intangible assets 
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in the field have been re-invented by nation branders, reinforcing the marketing logic 
based solely on a belief that brands, used as sources of soft power, lead to economic 
benefits. Fourth, unable to source high-profile corporate brands that use Polishness 
as country-of-origin effect technique, nation branders aimed to fill this gap by access-
ing field resources. Finally, misrecognition concerning the need for nation branding 
is based on the primacy of a symbolic asset, the nation brand, over other sources of 
influence.
Deep changes stemming from the interactions between state actors and nation 
branders include commodification of relations, of which transactional logic plays a 
central role in corporatisation.89 Summing up, the field displays multiple effects of 
nation branding on statecraft: mobilising effects (action and strategy shifts), popula-
rising effects (setting the institutional agenda), practical knowledge effects (routini-
sation strategies), homogenising effects (local appropriation), monopolising effects 
(nation branding appears as “owned” by the state), universalising effects (euphe-
mised legitimacy), and transgressive effects (nation branding travels across social 
boundaries). While the field maintains the pre-existing relations of domination and 
subordination, the ideology of nation branding is used by political actors to legiti-
mise these relations and, in doing so, advances the corporatisation of statecraft.
Unspoken in the discourse on nation branding is its relationship to other issues in 
public affairs, for example, economic or social policies, as potential sources of 
Poland’s soft power. The complexity of those areas, including their articulation and 
reception, raises questions about the practicalities of creating synergies in a field that 
displays a polyphonic approach to soft power statecraft. as it stands, nation branding 
tends to be “bolted” onto statecraft to re-package Poland’s soft power for public 
consumption, and the advocacy of nation branders has proved useful to Polish state 
actors in achieving this end. The findings illustrate that in Poland, despite its public 
appeal, nation branding struggles to maintain the appearance of de-politicisation as 
the field it has entered tends to monopolise representations of the state. aligned with 
Bourdieu’s argument considering transparency as a defence from “brute economic 
interests,”90 this article unfolds the inner working of nation branders, the effects of 
their ideological practice on statecraft, and points to its perpetuation in the field of 
power
Conclusions
This article analyses the perpetuation of nation branding and theorises it as an 
ideological practice in the field of soft power statecraft. It demonstrates how nation 
branding has been monopolised by the state and exists as a legitimising discourse, 
rather than an autonomous practice defined by a routinised code of conduct. as such, 
nation branders contribute to the reinforcement of the process of corporatisation of 
soft power statecraft. In demonstrating this, first, this article reveals the conditions 
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for the emergence of nation branding. Second, it shows that nation branding in 
Poland goes back to 1999 and can be traced back to multiple, coalition-based public 
affairs undertakings. Third, it shows that nation branders engage in campaign design 
as well as advocacy to turn it into statecraft. Fourth, it discusses how nation branding 
has left an ideological legacy in the field.
analysis of the process of corporatisation is a fruitful avenue for inquiry into soft 
power statecraft. This article’s analysis is, however, limited to a single national field 
of soft power statecraft. It reveals that nation branders entered the field as co-cam-
paigners and practical strategists aiming to change the approach to soft power. given 
the effects of nation branding, and its transgression of field boundaries, research on 
statecraft should focus on interplay that goes beyond the links between “hard power” 
and “soft power.”91 With think-tanks, digital media technology, or corporate-styled 
new practices ascending in the field (e.g., Donald Trump’s “deal-making” corporate 
talk in relation to Poland), more attention should be given to the interconnections of 
“older” and “newer” communicative practices. In the case of Poland, cultural inter-
mediaries have reinforced the managerialism and commercial orientation of the field 
and, by reproducing the ideology of nation branding, have adjusted statecraft to suit 
soft power capabilities for public consumption.
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